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Electronic health record (EHR) projects have been launched in most developed countries to increase the quality of healthcare
while decreasing its cost. The beneﬁts provided by centralizing the healthcare information in database systems are unquestionable
in terms of information quality, availability, and protection against failure. Yet, patients are reluctant to give to a distant server
the control over highly sensitive data (e.g., data revealing a severe or shameful disease). This paper capitalizes on a new hardware
portable device, associating the security of a smart card to the storage capacity of a USB key, to give back to the patient the control
over his medical data. This paper shows how this device can complement a traditional EHR server to (1) protect and share highly
sensitive data among trusted parties and (2) provide a seamless access to the data even in disconnected mode. The proposed
architecture is experimented in the context of a medicosocial network providing medical care and social services at home for
elderly people.
Copyright © 2008 Nicolas Anciaux et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of medicine, and before the advent of
computers, people have managed healthcare data manually,
accumulating drug prescriptions, examination results, and
other medical documents, all of which were inscribed on
paper and stored in physical folders at home or at the
family doctor oﬃce. Although archaic by today’s standards,
this manual information sharing scheme provided the data
owner (i.e., the patient) with control over the sharing and
usage of his or her information with the advised assistance
of his family doctor and under the protection of the
HippocraticOath.Thepatientcontrolwasnotcompromized
by the digitization of medical documents in a ﬁrst stage,
simply because the information was scattered among several
incompatible information systems in hospitals, clinics, and
practitioner’s oﬃces. No one knows where the information
is, how to access it, whether it is complete and accurate, and
under which format it has been produced.
During the last decade, several countries launched
ambitious electronic healthcare record (EHR) programs
with the objective to increase the quality of healthcare while
decreasing its cost [1]. For example, the national Con-
necting for Health (http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs
.uk) program in the UK, the National Switch Point
(http://www.nictiz.nl) managed by Nictiz in the Nether-
lands, or the healthcare system Infoway (http://www.info-
way-inforoute.ca/en/home/home.aspx) in Canada are all
running projects aiming at building a wide scale EHR. In
ar e c e n tr e p o r t[ 2], French Deputy J.-P. Door identiﬁed
more than 100 EHR running projects worldwide at the scale
of a country or region in a recent report. The objective2 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
of centralizing medical information in database systems is
manifold (centralization refers to the fact that the data is
stored, organized, made available,and controlled by database
servers, whatever the computer system infrastructure is):
completeness (i.e., to make the information complete and
up to date), availability (to make it accessible through the
internet 24 hours/7 days a week), usability (to organize
the data and make it easily queryable and interpretable),
consistency (to guarantee integrity constraints and enforce
atomicity and isolation of updates), durability (to protect the
data against failure), and security (to protect the data against
illegal accesses).
On the other hand, studies in diﬀerent countries [3,
4], show that several patients and even practitioners are
reluctant to use EHR systems arguing increasing threats on
individual privacy. This suspicion is fuelled by computer
security surveys pointing out the vulnerability of database
management systems (DBMSs) against external and internal
attacks [5]. Indeed, centralizing and organizing the informa-
tion make it more valuable, thereby motivating attacks, and
facilitates abusive usages. In consequence, EHR providers
must comply with very stringent legislation regarding the
storage and preservation of medical data. Regardless of the
security procedures put in place at the server and their
eﬀectiveness, the patient has the sense of losing control over
his or her data. There are four main reasons for that.
(i) Guidance of the patient consent: the patient is usually
asked to give his consent to an access control policy
specifyingwho(individualsorroles)isgrantedaccess
to which part of his folder. Even with the help
of a practitioner, it is diﬃcult to ensure that this
consent is fully enlightened. This is due to the high
number of people interacting with the folder, the
diversity of their roles, the complexity of the medical
information, and the intrinsic diﬃculty to determine
which data (or data association) reveals a given
pathology. Consequently, the patient usually adheres
to a predeﬁned access control policy that he does not
reallymaster.Complementarytoaccesscontrol,audit
trails can help the patient tracking a posteriori who
accessed which part of his folder and when. However,
audit trails exploitation is fairly complex and may
require a dedicated query language [6]. With respect
to the free expression of the patient consent, EHR
systems cannot compete with the archaic manual
information sharing scheme.
(ii) Unbounded data retention: limited data retention is
one of the central principles of laws related to the
safeguardofpersonaldata[7].Limiteddataretention
attaches a lifetime to a data (e.g., 10 years for a given
court sentence) after which it must be withdrawn
from the system [8]. Unfortunately, limited data
retention conﬂicts with the primary objective of an
EHR, that is building a complete medical history
of each patient. In addition, [9] highlighted the
diﬃculty to physically destroy information stored in
existing DBMSs, showing that it can be recovered
by a forensic analysis in many ways. This reinforces
the patient’s perception that his complete history is
recorded forever. A side eﬀect is that the patient
may choose not to store some information in his
folder (synonym of incompleteness and lower quality
of healthcare) because he cannot assess a priori the
sensitiveness of this information.
(iii) No security guarantee outside the server domain:
healthcare data is likely to be extracted from the
server and hosted in a client device (e.g., the doctor’s
or the patient’s device). Typically, healthcare folders
need to be extracted for use in a disconnected mode,
for example, to provide healthcare at home. This
situation will remain the rule for a while, that is until
every point of the territory be connected through
a secure, fast, reliable, and free of charge network.
Unfortunately, the hosting device is much more
spyware, trojan, and virus prone than the server,
introducing an important security breach in the
architecture.
(iv) No disconnected access to the folder: EHR has been
designed with online usage in mind. This may
c o n s t i t u t ear e a lb a r r i e rf o ral a r g ec a t e g o r yo f
patients (e.g., elderly, disabled, and needy people),
the prerequisite to get access to their folder being
either to use a terminal at some public place or to
own a PC, to master its use (including the computer
administration burden) and to pay for an internet
connection.Iftheselatterconditionsarenotsatisﬁed,
a practitioner providing healthcare at home will have
to download on his mobile device the folders of all
visited patients, a complex and time-consuming task,
beside the security breach mentioned above.
In this paper, we propose a novel organization of EHR
aiming at circumventing these four drawbacks. This orga-
nization capitalizes on a new hardware device called secure
portable token (SPT). Roughly speaking, an SPT combines a
secure microcontroller (similar to a smart card chip) with a
large external ﬂash memory (gigabyte sized) on a USB key
form factor [10, 11]. An SPT can host onboard data and
run onboard code with proven security properties thanks
to its tamper-resistant hardware and a certiﬁed operating
system [11]. Embedding a database system and a web server
in an SPT gives the opportunity to manage a healthcare
folder (or a part of it) outside the EHR server with no
loss of security. Accessing the onboard folder while being
disconnected from the network requires a simple rendering
deviceequippedwithaUSBportandrunningawebbrowser.
More, the embedded DBMS can be made self-administered
so that the patient keeps a full control over the onboard data,
with no external intervention of a database administrator.
The data retention period and the sharing of onboard data
can be organized similarly to the previous manual scheme,
under the patient control. The resulting architecture is
decentralized, with a central server managed by a public or
private database service provider and one embedded local
server per patient. Splitting the folder in a centralized part
and a local part remains under the patient’s responsibility.Nicolas Anciaux et al. 3
However, the local server cannot provide properties like
availability and durability on the local data on its own. We
will show that combining the capacities of the central server
and the local servers restores these fundamental properties.
Our project is not the ﬁrst to promote the use of
secure tokens. A growing number of initiatives are using
smart cards (e.g., the French Sesam Vitale [12], the
Patient Health Smart Card in New York [13], the National
Health Card System, (24 millions of smart cards, see
http://www.gi-de.com/portal/page? pageid=42,55000& dad
=portal& schema=PORTAL.), in Taiwan, etc.) to carry
patient’s national security number and practitioner’s
certiﬁcate in order to implement a strong identiﬁcation
process. Also, the German EHR initiative plans to use
smart cards to carry recent prescription information
[14]. As our project, the German initiative underlines the
interest of holding part of the patient’s folder locally.
However, this project uses a traditional smart card
technology thereby proscribing storing a signiﬁcant
volume of patient’s records locally (the smart card is
endowed with less than 100KB of stable memory, (Wiki in
German: http://www. de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elektronische
Gesundheitskarte), versus 256MB for the preliminary SPT
we are currently working on). To the best of our knowledge,
our project is the ﬁrst to tackle the technical challenges
related to the management (storage, querying, and secure
sharing) of large folders embedded in secure token.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the functional architecture of the proposed EHR system
and discusses diﬀerent scenarios, showing the beneﬁt of
combining a central EHR server with secure portable
folders. Section 3 sketches important technical challenges
and outlines the solutions proposed. Section 4 describes an
application of our solution to a medical network providing
healthcare at home and Section 5 concludes.
2. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND SCENARIOS
The proposed EHR architecture, pictured in Figure 1,i sb u i l t
around a central DBMS server providing the functionalities
mentioned above (completeness, availability, usability,
consistency, durability, and security) on all patient’s folders.
This server oﬀers an internet access to all authorized users
(e.g., doctors, nurses, etc.) and enforces access control
policies deﬁned by the patients. These policies are based on
default policies promoted by EHR groups like the GIP DMP
(the GIP DMP is in charge of setting up the French medical
folder project called DMP (dossier m´ edical personnel). See
http://www.d-m-p.org/docs/EnglishVersionDMP.pdf and
http://www.d-m-p.org/) and can be reﬁned with the help of
practitioners. To allow disconnected accesses to any patient
folder, a folder replica is managed on a secure portable token
(SPT) provided to each patient. Once endowed with the
appropriate embedded software (typically a web server and
a DBMS) and timely synchronized with the central server,
SPT servers successfully to surrogate the central server.
The access control policy deﬁned by the patient is enforced
uniformly on the central DBMS and on the SPT. Note
that the synchronization between central and SPT servers
must occur in all situations (e.g., even if an SPT remains at
patient’s home and is never connected to the network). We
detail this synchronization process later.
SPT is the means by which a patient can recover a
full control over his folder, similarly to the manual sharing
scheme. Let us assume that a patient is willing to hide
informationhejudgesashighlysensitive(e.g.,becauseitmay
reveal a serious or shameful disease). In a traditional EHR
system, if the patient does not fully trust the server or does
notfullyunderstandtheaccesscontrolpolicy(forthereasons
mentioned above), he has no other choice than discarding
this information, thereby producing an incomplete folder.
Here, the patient can store this information, called hidden
data (HD), locally on his SPT without replicating it on
the central server. A data which is not hidden is called
regular data (RD) and is replicated on the SPT and the
central server. If the patient changes his mind afterwards
(e.g., following the advice of his doctor), he still has the
opportunity to change the status of a data from hidden to
regular. Note that the reverse conversion (from regular to
hidden) is uncertain since the data could have been queried
and/or copied beforehand. Hiding data matches the privacy
objective but the durability property is lost for this data
s i n c eap o r t a b l et o k e ni sb yn a t u r en o td u r a b l e( i tm i g h t
be lost or destroyed). Durability can be restored by using
the central server as a repository for cryptoprotected data
(i.e., encrypted and signed). To this end, hidden data is
encrypted by the patient’s SPT and stored encrypted on the
central server but the encryption keys are never revealed
to the central server. (Note that encryption techniques are
sometimes used by central servers to protect the database
footprint [15]. With such server-based encryption solutions,
data is encrypted and decrypted on the ﬂy by the DBMS.
Server-based encryption is thus orthogonal to the SPT-based
encryption applied to hidden data). Encryption keys stay
under the SPT control and make themselves durable thanks
to a trusted depositary. The central server guarantees the
durability and availability of hidden data without being able
to interpret its content.
Let us now assume that the patient is willing to share
hidden data among a restricted trusted circle of persons. The
patient can deﬁne appropriate access control rules on this
data so that it becomes accessible to these people in the
presence of the patient and of his SPT (as in a paper-based
scheme). The SPT allows an even smarter way of exchanging
sensitive information. The patient may grant a trusted circle
of participants to access his hidden data even if it is not
together at the same physical place. This may be helpful
in case of emergency or if a remote diagnosis is required.
This can be implemented by sharing the encryption keys of
the hidden data among the SPTs of people participating in
the same trusted circle so that only these SPTs are able to
free the hidden data from its cryptoprotection. Note that
those keys are never externalized from the SPT, thus allowing
enforcing access control rules locally (those rules are stored
encrypted along with the hidden data on the central server).
To distinguish them in Figure 1,r e g u l a r( r e s p . ,h i d d e n )d a t a
and its related access control rules are pictured in white
(resp., grey). As mentioned above, the access control policy4 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
deﬁned by a patient must be enforced uniformly on the
central DBMS and on the SPT, independently of the status
of the data. With hidden data, the access control policy
is strengthened by the obligation of physically sharing the
encryption keys, and this sharing is totally under the patient
control. Once decrypted, hidden data is still protected by the
access control policy enforced by the SPT.
Let us illustrate the behavior of the system through
a scenario involving three participants: an elderly patient
named Bob, his family doctor Jim, and a nurse Lucy. Every
participant owns an SPT. Several medical examinations are
prescribed to Bob who designates a subset of them as
hidden (the others being considered as regular). The medical
lab performing the examination pushes the results on the
central server. Results corresponding to hidden data are
cryptoprotected using Bob’s public key before being pushed.
(Bob’s public key is delivered by a PKI server while Bob’s
private key is replicated on every SPT belonging to Bob’s
trusted circle. The management of private keys is under the
control of the secure chip and even the SPT holder cannot
interfere or tamper it. For the sake of conciseness, we do
not detail further the key exchange protocol among SPT. For
eﬃciency, asymmetric encryption is used only to encrypt
symmetric keys used to protect the hidden data).
Lucy frequently visits Bob at home. Bob has no internet
connection and seldom leaves home. Thus, Lucy acts as a
synchronization means for Bob’s folder (as any other person
visiting Bob and owning an SPT). Before the visit, Lucy
downloads from the central server only the latest updates,
either hidden or regular, performed in Bob’s folder. This
includes the recent examination results. During the visit,
Lucy’s and Bob’s SPTs are synchronized. The latest updates
from the central server are integrated in Bob’s local folder.
Conversely,thelatestupdatesperformedinBob’slocalfolder,
if any, are loaded on Lucy’s SPT. This allows refreshing the
central server replica the next time Lucy will connect to the
server. Synchronized data is only delivered to the recipient
(i.e., central server or patient’s SPT) using a secure protocol
(authentication and encryption). Lucy cannot get access to
this data, protected by the tamper resistance of the SPT.
Jim participates in Bob’s trusted circle. At his oﬃce, he
can connect to the central server and view Bob’s up-to-date
folder, including the results of the recent examinations and
possible updates carried back by Lucy (in the limit of Jim’s
access rights granted by Bob). When visiting Bob at home,
Jim can get the same level of information by connecting
locally to Bob’s SPT.
To summarize, any authorized people (or people playing
an authorized role) can connect to the central server or
to an SPT local server and retrieve the regular data he is
granted access to by the access control policy. No people
outside the trusted circle can get access to the hidden
data, whatever their role(s) and privilege(s). Indeed, this
hidden data is cryptoprotected on the central server and
the encryption keys are only known by the patient’s SPT
and by the SPTs of people belonging to her trusted circle.
Hidden data stored on the patient’s SPT beneﬁts from the
SPT’s tamper resistance. Encryption keys (symmetric and
private keys) are transmitted from the patient’s SPT to the
SPTs of the trusted circle using a secure protocol (based
on symmetric encryption). This transmission may happen
either in a connected mode or via another SPT as part of
the synchronization described above. Finally, synchronized
data (regular, hidden, or encryption keys) is never disclosed
to anyone except the recipient and is also protected during
transmission by a secure protocol.
This mode ofoperation provides strongerprivacy preser-
vation guarantees than any traditional EHR. First, attacks
conducted at the server can only reveal regular data, hidden
data being absent from the server or encrypted with keys
that are let under the control of the clients’ SPTs. Most
advanced server-based security solutions, even those using
encryption [15], cannot oﬀer such a level of protection
because encryption keys remain accessible at the server side
to enable query execution. Second, attacks conducted at the
client terminal cannot reveal more than the data displayed
by the application at runtime, but no data is ever stored
on client terminals in the clear. Third, the SPT inherits its
security from a tamper-resistant hardware and a certiﬁed
embedded code (certiﬁed CC EAL4 or 5, FIPS or using
other relevant scheme [11]). We do not argue that SPT
is provably unbreakable because ultimate security does not
exist but it makes the attacks so complex and costly to
implement as they become meaningless in practice. To make
the analysis complete, let us consider anyway the impact
of an SPT attack. Breaking a patient’s SPT will lead to
disclose hermedicalfolderstoredlocally(hiddenandregular
data); breaking a doctor’s SPT will lead to disclose the
encryption keys of the patients having registered this doctor
in their trusted circle; ﬁnally, breaking an SPT serving for
synchronization (typically a nurse’s SPT) will not disclose
any information.
3. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
Many technical challenges are introduced by the proposed
EHR architecture, like the access control deﬁnition and
enforcement, the management of encryption keys, the data
synchronization between the central server and the embed-
ded local servers, and so forth. Due to space limitation, this
section focuses on the challenges related to the SPT and the
embedded data management techniques which are central to
the architecture.
3.1. SPThardwareandoperatingsystem
An SPT aims at combining in the same hardware platform
as e c u r ec h i pa n dam a s ss t o r a g eN A N Dﬂ a s hm e m o r y
(several gigabytes soon). The secure chip is of the smart
card type, with a 32bit RISC CPU clocked at about 50MHz,
memory modules composed of ROM, tens of KB of static
RAM, a small quantity of internal stable storage (NOR
ﬂash) and security modules. A ﬁrst obvious challenge is
to produce this hardware platform and assess its tamper
resistance and performance. In this platform, the mass
storage NAND ﬂash memory is outside the secure chip
(connected by a bus) and does not beneﬁt from the chip
hardware protection. A second challenge is then to enforceNicolas Anciaux et al. 5
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the integrity and the conﬁdentiality of the data stored
in mass storage thanks to the cryptographic capability of
the secure chip, with a minimal impact on read/write
performance. Considering the increasing storage capacity,
computation power and communication throughput of this
new generation of smart tokens, integrating them in a
distributed architecture as regular computers is a third
challenge.
Gemalto, the smart card world leader, is developing an
experimental SPT platform. This platform includes a new
multitasking operating system allowing the development of
web applications based on Java and Servlet technology, and
thus oﬀering a standardized means to integrate services or
embeddedwebapplicationstotheSPT.Theoperatingsystem
supports natively:
(i) the USB 2.0 protocol and the internet protocol IP for
communicating with the external world [16];
(ii) multithreaded Java applications;
(iii) cryptographic primitives (some of which being
implemented in hardware);
(iv) memory management and garbage collection;
(v) servlet management and web server.
The internal architecture of the SPT in described in
Figure 2. For more technical details, we refer the reader to
[17].
3.2. Embeddeddatabasesystem
DBMS designers have produced light versions of their
systems for personal assistants (e.g., Oracle-lite, DB2 every-
place, SQL Server for Window CE) but they never addressed
the more complex problem of embedding a DBMS in a
chip. Initial attempts toward a smart card DBMS were ISOL’s
SQL Java machine [18], the ISO standard SCQL [19], and
the MasterCard Open Data Storage [20]. All these proposals
concerned traditional smart cards with few resources and
therefore proposed basic data management functionalities
(close to sequential ﬁles). Managing embedded medical fold-
ers requires much more powerful storage, indexation, access6 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
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control, and query capabilities. PicoDBMS was the ﬁrst full-
ﬂedged relational DBMS embedded in a smart card [21]a n d
was implemented on top of Gemalto’s smart card prototypes
[22]. The peculiarities of secure chip environments compel
to deeply revisit existing DBMS techniques like storage and
indexing models, query execution strategies and transaction
management. PicoDBMS has been designed for managing
databases stored in a (megabyte sized) EEPROM stable
memory integrated in the secure chip and protected by the
chip tamper resistance.
The SPT framework introduces important new chal-
lenges [23].
(1) How to support complex access rights and queries
over a gigabyte-sized onboard database (compared to
PicoDBMS, the database size grows by three orders
ofmagnitudewhiletheRAMresourcewasmultiplied
r o u g h l yb y5 ) ?
(2) How to organize the data storage and the indexes
with an acceptable insert/update time considering
the peculiarities of NAND ﬂash memory (fast reads,
costly writes, block-erase-before-page-rewrite con-
straint)?
(3) How to protect the onboard database against conﬁ-
dentialityandintegrityattackswithoutdegradingthe
query performance; this challenge is related to the
ﬂash protection problem mentioned in Section 3.1
butsolutionsspeciﬁctodatabasemanagementcanbe
devised to provide optimal performance?
Figure 3 depicts the main software modules of the
embedded DBMS, tagged with numbers indicating the
related technical challenge.
The Query Manager is in charge of parsing the incoming
SQL query, building an optimal query execution plan, and
executing it. This module must consider peculiar execution
strategies to answer complex SQL queries over a large
quantity of data (gigabytes) while coping with the SPT
hardware constraints (challenge 1). To tackle this challenge,
we designed a massive indexing scheme presented in [24],
which allows processing complex queries while consuming
as little RAM as possible and still exhibiting acceptable
performances. The idea is to combine in the same indexing
model generalized join indices and multitable selection
indices in such a way that any combination of selection and
join predicates can be evaluated by set operations over lists
of sorted tuple identiﬁers. The operator library (algorithms
fortheoperators ofthe relational algebra,e.g.,select,project,
join, and aggregate) and the execution engine integrate those
techniques.
The Storage Manager, on which the query manager relies
to access the database content (index and tables), is directly
concerned with challenge 2. Indeed, the proposed massive
indexationschemecausesadiﬃcultproblemintermsofﬂash
updates, due to the severe read/write constraints of NAND
ﬂash.Therefore,wedesignedastructurewhichmanagesdata
and index keys sequentially so that the number of rewrites
in ﬂash is minimized. The use of summarization structures
(basedonbloomﬁlters[25])andverticalpartitioningreduceNicolas Anciaux et al. 7
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the cost of index lookups. These additional structures are
also managed in sequence. A ﬁrst implementation of this
principle has been patented jointly by INRIA and Gemalto
[26] and is integrated in the current DBMS prototype.
The Hardware Manager embeds the methods for access-
ing the diﬀerent memory modules of the SPT (through the
Flash Translation Layer (FTL) [27] or with direct access). It
includes techniques associated with challenge 3, to protect
theconﬁdentialityandtheintegrityofthedata,inaneﬃcient
way with respect to DBMS access patterns. Indeed, our mas-
sive indexation technique leads to numerous, random, and
ﬁne grain accesses to raw data. We conducted preliminary
studies [28], in which we combine encryption, hashing, and
timestampingtechniqueswithqueryexecutiontechniquesin
order to satisfy three conﬂicting objectives: eﬃciency, high
security, and compliance with the chip hardware resources.
Finally, the Metadata Manager manages the DBMS
metadata, the access control rules regulating the access to
regular and hidden data and the encryption keys.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM
4.1. Experimentintheﬁeld
The functional architecture presented in Section 2 will be
experimented in the context of a medicosocial network
providingmedicalcareandsocialservicesathomeforelderly
people in the Yvelines district, France. Today, the coordi-
nation among the participants of this network (doctors,
nurses, physiotherapists, social workers, etc.) is organized
around a paper-based folder. This folder stays at home and
is queried and updated by every participant. This solution
suﬀers from two main drawbacks. First, instead of providing
a natural and controlled way of sharing medical and social
information, the paper-based folder is the primary source
of conﬁdentiality breach in this setting. Indeed, this folder
must be shared by all participants but there is no means by
which an eﬀective access control policy can be implemented.
Second, the folder cannot be accessed and ﬁlled remotely,
precluding remote diagnosis, and is often incomplete due to
its physical centralization. Replacing this paper-based folder
system by a traditional EHR would introduce the drawbacks
mentioned in Section 1. The proposed experimentation
will combine a central database with medicosocial folders
embedded in SPT, according to the architecture presented in
the previous section.
This experimentation will be conducted with a popula-
tion of about 100 volunteer patients and 25 practitioners and
social workers in the Yvelines district in France. It involves
the following partners: the French National Research Insti-
tute in Computer Sciences (INRIA), University of Versailles,
SANTEOS (EHR provider for the preﬁguration phase of the
French national healthcare folder system), Gemalto (world
leader in the smart card domain), ALDS (a home healthcare
association), and CoGITEY (a clinic with a section dedicated
to elderly people). This project is partly funded by the
Yvelines district council and by the French National Agency
for Research (ANR). The design phase started in January
2007 and the experimentation in the ﬁeld will be conducted
fall 2009.
4.2. Softwareplatform
In the experiment, the ﬁnal user (either practitioner or
patient) will be able to connect to a server (either central
or embedded) with a web browser running on any terminal
(ﬁxedormobile).Aweb-basedinterface(GUI)isprovidedto
browse the patient folder. By manipulating the GUI, the user
generates HTTP requests to the server, thereby activating
Servlets which in turn generate database queries and build
the next page of the interface. Whatever the server it is con-
nected to, the GUI provides similar functions, for example,
access to patients’ folders, authorization management, and
so forth. The software platform enabling this behavior is
presented in Figure 4.8 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
The central server is equipped with commercial software
including a web server (the GUI is generated using Servlets
and JavaServer Pages), a relational DBMS (to store, index,
and retrieve patients’ folders), and a server of identities (to
manage certiﬁcates and identiﬁers for medical and social
workers and patients).
The SPT embeds a proprietary web server and Servlets
communicating with a lightweight DBMS engine via a
JDBC-like driver. A synchronization module is also embed-
ded in the SPT to synchronize the embedded folder with
the copy stored in the central server. Thus, the software
deployed on the central server and the SPT provide similar
functionalities while relying on highly diﬀerent technology
to cope with the SPT hardware constraints. For more
information about the software platform, we refer the reader
to [17].
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an alternative to centralized
EHR systems, relying on a new hardware portable device
called secure portable token (SPT). This architecture is being
implemented in the scope of the DMSP and PlugDB projects
started in November 2006 and will be experimented in the
fall of 2009 in the context of a medical social network
providingmedicalcareandsocialservicesathomeforelderly
people.
The objectives pursued are
(i) to build a shared medicosocial folder providing the
highest degree of availability, whatever the mode of
operation (disconnected or not);
(ii) to reestablish a natural and powerful way of protect-
ing and sharing highly sensitive information among
trusted parties.
The expected outcome of this project is to demonstrate
that these two objectives can be reached with a positive
impact on the coordination of medical and social workers
and on the acceptation of patients of an electronic usage of
their medical history.
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